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ABSTRACT.  Two experiments show that violations of expected utility due to ambiguity, 
found in general decision experiments, also affect belief aggregation.  Hence we use 
modern ambiguity theories to analyze belief aggregation, thus obtaining more refined and 
empirically more valid results than traditional theories can provide.  We can now confirm 
more reliably that conflicting (heterogeneous) beliefs where some agents express 
certainty are processed differently than informationally equivalent imprecise 
homogeneous beliefs.  We can also investigate new phenomena related to ambiguity.  For 
instance, agents who express certainty receive extra weight (a cognitive effect related to 
ambiguity-generated insensitivity) and generate extra preference value (source 
preference; a motivational effect related to ambiguity aversion).  Hence, incentive 
compatible belief elicitations that prevent manipulation are especially warranted when 
agents express certainty.  For multiple prior theories of ambiguity, our findings imply that 
the same prior probabilities can be treated differently in different contexts, suggesting an 
interest in corresponding generalizations. 
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Aggregating Imprecise or Conflicting Beliefs:  
An Experimental Investigation Using Modern Ambiguity Theories 
Introduction 
People's beliefs are mostly shaped by what they learn from other people.  For many 
important decisions, advice from others, preferably experts, is aggregated into a final 
judgment.  Hence, a rich literature has developed on belief aggregation (Clemen & 
Winkler 1999; Cooke 1991; Dietrich 2010).  This literature has mostly used Savage’s 
(1954) subjective probabilities to quantify degrees of belief, implemented in his 
Bayesian (expected utility) model for decision making. 
 Belief aggregation typically concerns events with unknown probabilities.  Such 
events, commonly called ambiguous, are known to generate non-Bayesian behavior 
(Ellsberg 1961; Keynes 1921; Knight 1921).  Our paper will show that such 
deviations from Bayesianism are relevant for belief aggregation.  We thus contribute 
to recent literature using ambiguity models rather than Bayesian models to analyze 
belief aggregation (Baraldi & Zio 2010; Gajdos et al. 2008; Zimper and Ludwig 2009; 
Teper 2010).  These recent papers added decision models to earlier studies that 
investigated the aggregation of imprecise probabilities in statistics, fuzzy set theory, 
and artificial intelligence (Nau 2002 and its references).  Whereas these recent papers 
and their predecessors were theoretical, our contribution will be empirical.  By 
recognizing the empirical violations of Bayesianism, we obtain results for belief 
aggregation that are empirically more valid than those obtained before in Bayesian 
analyses.  We can identify and isolate the relevant factors and their effects more 
reliably. 
 This paper will use Abdellaoui et al.’s (2011) source method to analyze 
ambiguity.  This method is based on axiomatized decision models (Gilboa 1987; 
Gilboa & Schmeidler 1989; Schmeidler 1989; Tversky & Kahneman 1992), and its 
tradeoff between parsimony and fit suits our purposes well.  In particular, we will use 
Abdellaoui et al.’s indexes of pessimism and insensitivity, and will adapt them to our 
direct measurements of ambiguity.  As explained by these authors, pessimism 
(ambiguity aversion in our case) is a motivational component, related to a general 
disliking or liking of ambiguity.  Insensitivity (in our case ambiguity-generated, 
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referred to as a-insensitivity) is another, cognitive, component (Kunreuther, 
Novemsky, and Kahneman 2001) prior to any preference and orthogonal to the 
aversion/seeking component.  It reflects a lack of understanding of uncertainty and is 
needed, besides ambiguity aversion, to explain the ambiguity attitudes that are found 
empirically.  It explains, for instance, that people take uncertainty too much as fifty-
fifty, and do not sufficiently discriminate between different levels of likelihood.  A-
insensitivity is the extension to ambiguity of the well-known inverse-S shaped 
probability weighting.  The two components, ambiguity aversion and a-insensitivity, 
depend on the source of uncertainty considered, and can, for example, be different 
when the source of uncertainty concerns domestic stocks or foreign stocks. 
 For the sake of clarity, our paper will study the simplest possible situations of 
belief aggregation, where there is only one event to be judged by a decision maker 
and there are only two agents (we will use this term henceforth) whose judgments are 
aggregated by the decision maker.  We also assume that there is no interaction 
between the agents themselves, or between the agents and the decision maker, so that 
no group process is involved.   
 We will investigate how decision makers aggregate belief judgments for three 
sources of uncertainty.  The first source serves as a control treatment.  Here both 
agents are Bayesian and agree with each other (and everyone else).  This is the 
common case of generally accepted objective probabilities, with no ambiguity 
involved.  We call this source risk.   
 For the second source of uncertainty, each agent alone fully satisfies 
Bayesianism, with a precise probability judgment.  However, the two agents give 
different judgments, generating ambiguity for the decision maker aggregating their 
beliefs.
1
  This source of uncertainty, which is characterized by between-agent 
ambiguity (heterogeneous beliefs), is called conflict (C-)ambiguity in this paper. 
 The third source of uncertainty is characterized by within-agent ambiguity and 
relates to the situation where each agent gives an imprecise probability judgment.  
                                                
1
 Studies with varying degrees of conflicting information include Budescu et al. (2003), 
Cameron (2005), Dean and Shepherd (2007), Einhorn and Hogarth (1985), Kopylov (2008), 
Kunreuther et al. (1995), Lobo & Yao (2010), and Smithson (1999).  Viscusi and Chesson 
(1999) and Viscusi (1997) showed how conflicting information from different sources is 
especially prone to generating irrational behavior. 
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This situation is closest to ambiguity as mostly studied in the literature.
2
  In this paper, 
this third source of uncertainty is called imprecision (I-)ambiguity.  To keep our 
analysis as simple as possible, we assume homogeneous beliefs in the I-ambiguity 
case; i.e., the two agents agree.  Smithson (1999) and Cabantous (2007) found 
differences between the second and third sources of uncertainty (conflict versus 
imprecision) in experiments, but Cabantous et al. (2011) found no clear differences.  
Our paper reconsiders the case using ambiguity theories. 
 Our experiment concerns loss outcomes.  Risk and ambiguity attitudes for losses 
are subject to debate and, hence, their study is of special interest.  Classical economics 
assumes universal risk aversion, but Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory 
argued for risk seeking for losses (reviewed by Wakker 2010 p. 264).  Most 
theoretical studies assume universal aversion to ambiguity, but most empirical studies 
find prevailing ambiguity seeking for losses (Viscusi and Chesson 1999; Wakker 
2010 p. 354).  Although losses and gains are equally important for applications, 
academic studies have focused almost exclusively on gains.  This paper focuses on 
risk and ambiguity for losses. 
 In two experiments, we measure certainty equivalents of risky prospects and find 
the usual violations of expected utility, with inverse-S shaped probability weighting.  
This finding underscores the desirability to use nonexpected utility in our descriptive 
analysis.  We then measure matching probabilities (objective-probability gambles 
equivalent to gambles on conflict or imprecision ambiguity).   
 For I-ambiguity, which is close to the usual form of ambiguity, we find the 
common amplification of the overweighting of extreme events, reflecting increased 
insensitivity.  For C-ambiguity, if analyzed in the usual way (taking midpoints of 
probability intervals), we find the opposite, with reduced insensitivity.  We do not 
interpret the latter finding as a violation of common views on ambiguity, but rather as 
evidence against taking probability midpoints: In C-ambiguity, experts expressing 
certainty are believed more than experts expressing doubts.  This interpretation is 
supported by direct measurements of belief that were added in the second experiment.  
Our finding underscores that agents may misleadingly suggest certainty in cases of 
                                                
2
  See Wallsten, Forsyth, & Budescu (1983).  Camerer and Weber (1992), Chow and 
Sarin (2001), Ellsberg (1961), Ho, Keller & Keltyka (2002, 2005), and Roca, Hogarth, & 
Maule (2006) studied attitudes to varying degrees of imprecise probabilities. 
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doubt to disproportionally influence decisions.  This makes it extra desirable for 
principals to ensure that bonuses are incentive-compatible (Zeckhauser and Viscusi 
1990). 
 
1  Theory 
1.1  Prospects and their evaluation 
The preferences of a decision maker concern prospects.  A prospect yields outcome x 
or y, where it is uncertain which of the two will result.  We assume x ≤ y ≤ 0 
throughout.  Hence, outcomes are losses (if negative) or 0.  We assume that two 
agents have given their judgment on the likelihood of the outcomes, and we consider 
the following three situations, formally referred to as sources (of uncertainty). 
 
• Risk: xpy denotes a prospect yielding x with known objective probability p and y 
with probability 1−p.  Everyone agrees about the probabilities, including the two 
agents. 
• Imprecision (I) ambiguity: The agents are not able to give a precise probability 
judgment, and they only indicate a probability interval.  We assume that they give 
the same interval [ℓ,h].  x[ℓ,h]y denotes the resulting prospect.  We assume 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ 
h ≤ 1 throughout. 
• Conflict (C) ambiguity: x{ℓ,h}y denotes the prospect with no known probabilities 
available.  Both agents give a precise probability judgment, but the two judgments 
are different.  One agent judges the probability to be ℓ, whereas the other judges it 
to be h.  We again assume 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ h ≤ 1 throughout. 
 
 Our study only uses prospects that yield no more than two outcomes, both 
nonpositive.  Virtually all decision models existing today agree on this domain.
3
  
                                                
3
 For risk these models include, besides Quiggin’s (1982) rank-dependent model: (a) 
Birnbaum’s (2008) RAM and TAX models; (b) Gul’s (1991) disappointment aversion theory; 
(c) Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) original prospect theory when restricted to losses; Tversky 
& Kahneman's (1992) new prospect theory when restricted to losses; Viscusi’s (1989) 
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They all amount to the following evaluation, which we call binary rank-dependent 
utility.  When choosing between prospects, the one with the highest evaluation is 
preferred. 
 xpy  ! w(p)U(x) + (1−w(p))U(y); (1.1) 
 x[ℓ,h]y  !  W[ℓ,h]U(x) + (1−W[ℓ,h])U(y); (1.2) 
  x{ℓ,h}y !  W{ℓ,h}U(x) + (1−W{ℓ,h})U(y). (1.3) 
Here U: " → " is the utility, assumed continuous and strictly increasing.  For 
simplicity, we assume U(0) = 0.  Moreover, w: [0,1] → [0,1] is the probability 
weighting function, and is assumed continuous and strictly increasing with w(0) = 0 
and w(1) = 1.  Similarly, W[ℓ,h] and W{ℓ,h} are event weighting functions, taking 
values between 0 and 1.  Note that loss aversion plays no role for pure loss (or gain) 
prospects, as in our domain, because it only concerns the exchange rate between gain 
and loss utility. 
 Given that we focus on one event (under different states of information), we do 
not need to specify further restrictions on W for the purposes of this paper.  It is 
natural that both Ws are increasing in ℓ and h.  Following the conventions of prospect 
theory, we have chosen formulas where the weighting is first applied to the outcome x 
farthest remote from 0, which here is the worst loss.  Alternative formulas where the 
best outcome is weighted first are data equivalent (Wakker 2010 §7.6).  Our choice 
implies that overweighting (W large) enhances risk aversion and pessimism. 
 In our experiments, we measure certainty equivalents of risky prospects.  The 
certainty equivalent (CE) of a prospect is the sure amount that is equally preferred 
(indifferent, denoted ~) to the prospect. That is, U(CE) is equal to the above 
evaluation of the prospect.  We compare different sources of uncertainty.  For 
example, we define the matching probability of [ℓ,h] as the probability r such that 
x[ℓ,h]y ~ xry for all x,y, and the matching probability of {ℓ,h} as the probability r such 
that x{ℓ,h}y ~ xry for all x,y.  A matching probability always exists and is unique.  
                                                                                                                                      
prospective reference theory.  For uncertainty they include, besides the rank-dependent 
(Choquet-expected) utility model of Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989), the α-Hurwicz 
criterion (Arrow & Hurwicz 1972), the maxmin expected utility model (Gilboa & Schmeidler 
1989) and the α-maxmin model, Gajdos et al.’s (2008) contraction expected utility, and 
Tversky & Kahneman's (1992) prospect theory when restricted to gains or to losses. 
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Because an indifference for any one pair x < y implies the same indifference for all 
such x,y, we can use any such pair to find matching probabilities. 
 
1.2  Properties of probability weighting functions (risk attitude) 
Figure 1 depicts some possible properties of weighting functions w(p) for risk.  We 
will later consider similar properties for other functions (matching probabilities).  Fig. 
1a depicts overweighting of losses, implying pessimism and enhancing risk aversion.  
Fig. 1b describes the opposite pattern.  Figure 1c shows an inverse-S shape that 
combines optimism and pessimism, with overweighting of small probabilities and 
underweighting of large probabilities.  All weights are then moved towards 0.5, 
suggesting a lack of sensitivity and of discriminatory power.  It is a move in the 
direction of taking everything as fifty-fifty. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Although there have not yet been many empirical studies into risk attitudes for 
losses, the prevailing shape so far has been the one in Fig. 1d (Wakker 2010 §9.5).  It 
is the combination of some optimism and insensitivity.  It is similar to the prevailing 
shape for gains (where the low elevation reflects pessimism rather than optimism), but 
is closer to linearity.  The underweighting of high probabilities of worst outcomes 
implies, by complementarity, that small probabilities of good outcomes are 
overweighted.  In what follows, the expression that extreme and rare events are 
overweighted refers to both these phenomena.  For the purposes of this paper we need 
not define the aforementioned properties formally, because we can use graphs to 
illustrate them.  Formal definitions are in Wakker (2010 Chs. 6 and 7). 
 
1.3  Properties of matching probabilities (ambiguity attitude) 
We now turn to ambiguity and events E without unknown probabilities.  Properties 
similar to the ones explained for w(p) can be defined for general weighting functions 
W(E), even though we cannot draw graphs for W (Wakker 2010 Ch. 10).  For the 
special case studied in this paper, graphs can still be devised and used, as will be done 
in what follows. 
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 We will consider events related to probability pairs 
 [p−r, p+r] and {p−r, p+r} 
only for one fixed r (r = 0.1 in the experiments).  These probability pairs thus depend 
only on the midpoint probability p, and we can define 
 W[p−r, p+r] = wi(p) (1.4) 
and 
 W{p−r, p+r} = wc(p). (1.5) 
Here wi is the imprecision weighting function and wc is the conflict weighting 
function.  In the literature, it is common to relate [p−r, p+r] and {p−r, p+r} to a degree 
of belief equal to the midpoint probability p,
4
 and to interpret r as a measure of 
ambiguity.  We take this approach as our working hypothesis, we test its plausibility, 
and we will later discuss deviations. 
 Weighting functions W can conveniently be summarized in terms of w, the 
weighting function for risk, and matching probabilities m, because, by the evaluations 
assumed (Eqs. 1.1-1.3), xEy ~ xm(E)y implies  
 W(E) = w(m(E)).  (1.6) 
For later purposes, we rewrite it as 
 m = w−
1
(W).   (1.7) 
Thus, the general attitude towards uncertainty consists of the risk attitude comprised 
by w(p), and added on top of that, the ambiguity attitude comprised by the matching 
probability function m.  Ambiguity is the difference between uncertainty and risk, and 
is thus captured by m.  Before ambiguity theories became popular, matching 
probabilities were widely used in expected utility to measure subjective probabilities 
(Arrow 1951, Footnote 4; Holt 2007 §30.5; Raiffa 1968; Winkler 1972 p. 272).  Their 
usefulness for studying ambiguity has recently been recognized (Budescu et al. 2002; 
Hollard, Massoni, & Vergnaud 2010; Kahn & Sarin 1988; Viscusi & Magat 1992).  
Given a fixed r, we can define matching probabilities mi(p) and mc(p) as the matching 
probabilities for I- and C-ambiguity (details follow below).  They now are maps on 
                                                
4
 See Clemen and Winkler (1986), Cooke (1991), Curley & Yates (1989), Viscusi et al. 
(1994), and Wallsten et al. (1997).  For a discussion see Larrick and Soll (2006).  Underlying 
theoretical models are in Gajdos et al. (2008) and Kopylov (2008). 
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the unit interval, and graphs can be drawn as before to depict their properties.  We 
have 
 W[p−r, p+r] = wi(p) = w(mi(p)); (1.8) 
 W{p−r, p+r} = wc(p) = w(mc(p)); (1.9) 
 mi(p) = w−
1
wi(p)  and mc(p) = w−
1
wc(p).  (1.10) 
 Pessimism of the matching-probability function m reflects higher pessimism for 
uncertainty than for risk, i.e., ambiguity aversion.  Insensitivity of m similarly reflects 
higher insensitivity for uncertainty than for risk, which we call a(mbiguity-generated) 
insensitivity. 
 Figure 2 depicts some graphs of matching probabilities, using our working 
hypothesis that we can use midpoint probabilities on the x-axes.  The general attitude 
towards uncertainty (beyond the utility component) is the composition of a curve 
from Figure 1 (risk attitude) and one from Figure 2 (ambiguity attitude).  For 
example, the curve in Fig. 1d, if combined with the one in Fig. 2g, gives a curve like 
these two but more pronounced.  This is consistent with the common empirical 
finding that attitudes towards uncertainty are like those towards risk, but more 
pronounced (Abdellaoui, Vossmann, & Weber 2005; Fellner 1961 p. 684; Gayer 
2010; Hogarth & Einhorn 1990; Kahn & Sarin 1988 p. 270; Kahneman & Tversky 
1979 p. 281; Kilka & Weber 2001; Machina 1982 p. 292; Weber 1994 p. 237/238).  
In other words, the effects of ambiguity (matching probabilities) reinforce those of 
risk. 
1.4  Indexes of aversion and insensitivity towards ambiguity 
This paper quantitatively analyses ambiguity attitudes through matching probabilities, 
using Abdellaoui et al.'s (2011) indexes of pessimism and insensitivity.  We modify 
these indexes regarding two aspects of our study.  First, we deal with losses.  
Consequently, overweighting captures pessimism, and not optimism as for gains.  We 
therefore multiply the original pessimism index by –1 so that it still corresponds with 
pessimism.  Second, we consider these indexes for matching probabilities (as 
functions of midpoint probabilities) rather than for regular weighting functions.  This 
means that the risk component w has been removed.  Thus, the index of pessimism 
represents the extra pessimism generated by ambiguity on top of the pessimism for 
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risk.  That is, it reflects ambiguity aversion.  Similarly, the index of a-insensitivity 
captures the extra insensitivity generated by ambiguity. 
 To compute the indexes, we use linear regression to find linear functions 
 c + sp (truncated at values 0 and 1) (1.11) 
that best fit the (data points observed regarding the) matching probabilities.  We 
emphasize that this regression line should not be interpreted as a statistical estimation.  
It only serves to recode data using mathematical calculations.  Thus, we choose c and 
s in Eq. 1.11 to minimize a squared distance without any reference to an underlying 
statistical model.  Similarly, the linear regression should not be interpreted as any 
commitment to the neo-the additive weighting functions of Eq. 1.11.  It can be applied 
to any weighting function chosen by a researcher, also if not neo-additive, and to any 
set of data points, so as to obtain indexes of ambiguity attitude. 
 We call d the dual intercept, i.e. d = 1 – c – s.  We define 
 c – d: index of ambiguity aversion (1.12) 
and 
 c + d (= 1 – s): index of a-insensitivity. (1.13) 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In Figure 2, higher rows correspond with higher curves and higher indexes of 
ambiguity aversion.  Writing qa for an ambiguous (midpoint) probability q of [q−r, 
q+r] or of {q−r, q+r}, the matching probabilities of 0.5a are 0.46, 0.50, and 0.54 in the 
central Figs. 2h, 2e, and 2b, respectively.  These correspond with indifferences 
−10000.5a0 ~  −10000.460, −10000.5a0 ~  −10000.500, and −10000.5a0 ~  −10000.540, 
respectively.  The indifferent risky prospect becomes more and more unfavorable, in 
agreement with more and more ambiguity aversion. 
 Left curves in Figure 2 correspond with increased a-insensitivity.  We consider a 
pair of ambiguous prospects (−10000.1a0, −10000.9a0).  Here, and in the pairs 
considered next, the right prospect is more unfavorable.  We consider the pair for the 
right, central, and left figures in the middle row.  These figures give the following 
pairs of risky prospects indifferent to the two ambiguous prospects.  Fig. 2f: 
(−10000.020, −10000.980); Fig.2e: (−10000.100, −10000.900); Fig. 2d: (−10000.180, 
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−10000.820).  In these three pairs, the two risky prospects get closer and closer to each 
other.  The subject discriminates different levels of likelihood less and less, and 
exhibits more and more a-insensitivity.  This effect is related to the cognitive 
component of discriminating different levels of likelihood under ambiguity.  Fig. 2e 
depicts neutrality with respect to both components, and both indexes are 0 there. 
 In general, the indexes of Abdellaoui et al. (2011) can be calculated for any 
function on the unit interval, or set of data points of such a function.  They involve the 
best-fitting regression line on the (0,1) interval, and reflect global elevation and 
sensitivity.  Their interpretations depend on the function for which they are 
calculated.  Abdellaoui et al. (2011) considered the indexes for source functions, 
transforming additive subjective probabilities into decision weights, and capturing all 
deviations from expected utility.  Ambiguity attitudes, reflecting differences between 
known and unknown probabilities, could then be derived from differences between 
source functions for unknown probabilities and those for known probabilities.  We 
consider the indexes for matching probabilities.  As Eqs. 1.6-1.10 show, the risk 
component has then been removed and, hence, our indexes directly reflect ambiguity.  
It is a common working hypothesis in studies of probability intervals that matching 
probabilities equal to the midpoints of those intervals reflect ambiguity neutrality, as 
in Fig. 2e. 
 
2  Experiment A: Measuring risk attitudes and ambiguity attitudes for imprecise 
and conflicting sources of information 
This first, explorative, experiment examines risk and ambiguity attitudes for I- and C-
sources. 
 Analysis.  We measure certainty equivalents of several prospects.  We first derive 
utility and probability weighting for risk.  Then we study ambiguity attitudes by 
analyzing how the two ambiguous sources differ from risk.  The latter is done by 
analyzing how their matching probabilities differ from the corresponding midpoint 
probabilities.  In what follows, we derive matching probabilities from parametric 
fitting.  Appendix A3 reports on the results of an alternative, parameter-free analysis, 
based on direct comparisons of CEs, which gives results consistent with those 
reported in the main text. We use power utility,  
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 u(x) = −(−x/1000)
β
, x ≤ 0, β > 0,  (2.1) 
and Goldstein and Einhorn’s (1987) probability weighting function,  
 w(p) = δp
γ
/(δp
γ
+(1−p)
γ
), δ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, (2.2) 
to fit data for risk.  These families are commonly used.  Utility u is concave (u´ 
decreasing as the negative x increases towards 0), enhancing risk aversion, whenever 
β ≥ 1, and it is convex whenever β ≤ 1.   
 The larger δ is, the more elevated the probability weighting curve is, generating 
more pessimism.  The larger γ is, the more sensitive the curve is.  If we calculate the 
pessimism and insensitivity indexes for the probability weighting functions for risk 
considered here
5
, then δ will be closely related to the pessimism index and γ will be 
closely related to the insensitivity index.   
 In both experiments, we used a standard nonlinear least square regression 
(Levendberg-Marquadt algorithm) to simultaneously obtain the estimates of the utility 
and probability weighting parameters.  Throughout this paper, t-tests are two-sided 
unless stated otherwise. 
 Subjects.  N = 61 post-graduate students (60 male, median age = 22) in civil 
engineering at Arts et Métiers ParisTech, Paris, France
6
 were invited by email.  None 
of them had participated in an experiment on decision making before. 
 Stimuli.  We measured the certainty equivalents of the 20 prospects in Table 1.  
Throughout this paper, the probability spread r is 0.1.  For each source, we considered 
five different (midpoint) probability levels p, namely 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9.  For 
example, prospect number A11 (−1000[0,0.2]0) was the second one presented to the 
subjects, as indicated by rank 2 in the table.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Incentives.  The subjects were given a fixed €10 participation fee.  Our use of 
hypothetical choice rather than real incentives is discussed in §4. 
                                                
5
 Here they do not reflect ambiguity attitudes but risk attitudes. 
6
 The instructions and the presentations of the prospects in the experiment were accordingly 
written in French. 
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 Procedure.  The prospects were presented to the subjects on a computer screen in 
a fixed random order (see the column Rank in Table 1).  The sure loss was always 
displayed on the right-hand side of the screen and the other prospect was shown on 
the left-hand side.  The subjects had to choose between these two options.  The 
following text was given to the subjects to describe the risky prospects, where the 
agents were called experts: “The two experts have exactly the same best estimate of 
the risk.  Each expert confidently estimates that there is a (100p)% risk of losing €x 
(otherwise, the loss is €y)” (screenshot A in Figure A.1 in the appendix).  We 
substituted the appropriate numerical values for p.  Screenshots of typical choice tasks 
are available in the appendix. 
 The explanation for C-ambiguity was as follows: “The two experts do not agree 
on the risk.  They have different best estimates: Expert A confidently estimates that 
there is a 100(p−0.1)% risk of losing €1000 (otherwise, the loss is €0). Expert B 
confidently estimates that there is a 100(p+0.1)% risk of losing €1000 (otherwise, the 
loss is €0)”  (screenshot B in Figure A.1).  We substituted the appropriate numerical 
values for p + 0.1 and p − 0.1.  In addition, we displayed two different pie graphs, one 
for each expert’s prediction, to visually make clear that the two experts did not have 
the same estimate of the probability of the loss. 
 The explanation for I-ambiguity was as follows: “The two experts have exactly 
the same best estimate of the risk.  Each expert confidently estimates that the risk of 
losing €x ranges from 100(p−0.1)% to 100(p+0.1)% (otherwise, the loss is €0).”  A 
dynamic pie was shown on the screen to convey the imprecision of the forecast, with 
the size of the sectors of the pie chart slowly changing between the two bounds of the 
interval. 
 Measuring certainty equivalents.  For each of the 20 prospects, the subjects were 
asked to make approximately 5 binary choices between the prospect and a sure loss in 
a bisection procedure.  In this procedure, the midpoint between the best sure loss less 
preferred and the worst sure loss more preferred than the prospect is taken as the CE 
of the prospect.  Details are in the appendix. 
 Checking consistency.  At the end of the experiment, the subjects were asked to 
give their preferences between 6 prospects (A1, A3, A16, A18, A11, and A13) and 
their expected value a second time (the first time was as the first preference question 
in bisection). 
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2.1  Results 
Consistency checks 
Table 2 gives the consistency rates for the six questions presented twice.  The 
consistency rates vary between 69% and 89%, with an average of 77.32%.  In other 
words, approximately three-quarters of the subjects gave the same answer the second 
time.  This rate agrees with common findings in the field (Abdellaoui 2000; Camerer 
1989). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Risk attitudes from parametric fitting 
Table 3 displays the results from data fitting for risk. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The estimated β exceeds 1 (p < 0.01, t60 = 3.99), indicating concave utility.  The 
probability weighting function exhibits a small degree of elevation (pessimism), and 
the usual inverse S-shape (δ < 1, p < 0.01, t60 = –6.00; γ < 1, p = 0.03, t60 = –2.24).  
Details are in the appendix. 
 
Ambiguity attitudes from parametric fitting using matching probabilities 
Having estimated the utility function U, weights W(E) can be obtained from 
indifferences CE ~ xEy, for E = {ℓ,h} or E = [ℓ,h] using the formula 
 W(E) = Error! . (2.3) 
With all weighting functions available, we obtain matching probabilities through Eq. 
1.10.  Figure 3 reports their mean values and 95% confidence intervals.  This figure 
provides a graphical illustration of I- and C-ambiguity attitudes.  The figures are 
similar to Figs. 2a and 2f, but are closer to linearity. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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 The ambiguity aversion index for I is positive (mean = 0.06, p < 0.01, t60 = 2.94).  
We find no ambiguity aversion or seeking for C-ambiguity (mean = 0.00; p = 0.97, t60 
= 0.04).  The index of I-ambiguity aversion exceeds that of C-ambiguity aversion (p < 
0.01, t60 = 2.75).  The a-insensitivity index for I-ambiguity is positive (mean = 0.13, p 
< 0.01, t60 = 3.84) and for C-ambiguity it is negative (mean = –0.05, p = 0.04, t60 = –
2.08).  It is, obviously, higher for I-ambiguity than for C-ambiguity (p < 0.01, t60 = 
6.83). 
 We find the following differences for matching probabilities: mi(0.1) > 0.1 (mean 
= 0.19, p < 0.01, t60 = 4.43),  mi(0.9) < 0.9 (mean = 0.86, p < 0.01, t60 = −2.87), and 
mc(0.1) < 0.1 (mean = 0.06, p < 0.01, t60 = –4.20).  An ANOVA corrected for 
repeated measures (with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction) with two factors (the five 
probability levels and the two types of ambiguity) and their interaction confirms the 
above results.  The probability level is significant (p < 0.01, F3.11 = 492.94).  The 
matching probabilities differ across the two types of ambiguity (p < 0.01, F0.1 = 7.57).  
These differences are influenced by the probability level (p < 0.01, F205.17 = 9.24).  
Using paired t-tests adjusted with the Bonferroni correction, we find that mi(0.1) > 
mc(0.1) (p < 0.01, t60 = –6.71) and mi(0.9) < mc(0.9) (p < 0.01, t60 = 3.50).  Other 
differences are not significant.  To illustrate the size of the differences found, consider 
a loss of €1000 with a midpoint probability p = 0.10.  The average CE is €102 for 
conflict-ambiguity, €146 for risk, and €221 for imprecision-ambiguity.  Such small-
probability losses are relevant for insurance, where the different sources generate big 
differences in insurance premiums. 
2.2  Summary and discussion of results of Experiment A 
Risk attitudes.  Our results for probability weighting under risk agree with the 
prevailing findings in the literature.  We find an inverse-S shape with overweighting 
of small probabilities and underweighting of moderate and large probabilities.  The 
latter enhances optimism and risk seeking for losses.  We find weakly concave utility.  
Many papers have found that utility for losses is close to linear and preferences are 
close to risk neutrality (reviewed by Wakker 2010 p. 264).  Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, 
and L'Haridon (2008) also found weakly concave utility in combination with weakly 
prevailing risk seeking for losses.   
 Viscusi, Phillips, & Kroll (2011) showed that observations of other people’s 
choices do influence own decisions even when the own risks are fully known, so that 
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the choices of the other people are not informative.  This effect can play a role in our 
experiment if the experts’ information is taken as reflecting the experts’ decisions.  
However, this effect is intrinsic in belief aggregation, and we do not consider it to be 
a distortion. 
 Evidence against the Bayesian model.  As just explained, the probability 
weighting functions for risk deviate significantly from the Bayesian identity function 
w(p) = p, falsifying expected utility.  The deviations of the curves in Figure 3 by 
themselves could be accommodated by the Bayesian model, by assuming that 
(Bayesian) subjective probabilities deviate from the midpoints of the intervals.  
However, these deviations are too pronounced at the extremes, especially for I-
ambiguity, to be plausible.  Experiment B will provide further evidence. 
 I-ambiguity aversion and C-ambiguity neutrality.  The predictions on ambiguity 
aversion for losses are divided in the literature.  The common assumption, especially 
in the theoretical literature, is universal ambiguity aversion, for both gains and losses, 
and some empirical studies have confirmed this.  Yet, most empirical studies have 
found prevailing ambiguity seeking, rather than aversion, for losses (reviewed by 
Wakker 2010 p. 354).  Thus, the case is not very clear for losses.  One reason that 
patterns for losses are less clear is that losses are more difficult for subjects to process 
than gains, and losses generate more noise (de Lara Resende & Wu 2010 p. 129).  The 
(global) ambiguity aversion indexes for matching probabilities show that there is 
more pessimism for I-ambiguity than for risk; i.e., we find more I-ambiguity aversion 
than I-ambiguity seeking.  For C-ambiguity on the other hand, the overall index does 
not deviate from neutrality and there is as much C-ambiguity aversion as C-ambiguity 
seeking. 
 A-insensitivity for I- and C-ambiguity.  Because insensitivity is a cognitive 
component, it can be expected to be less affected by the domain (gain or loss) of 
outcomes.  Hence we can expect to find a-insensitivity, commonly observed in the 
gain domain, in the loss domain as well.  We indeed find a-insensitivity for I-
ambiguity.  In other words, people are more insensitive towards imprecise 
probabilities (I-ambiguity) than towards known probabilities (risk).  Thus, I-
ambiguity amplifies insensitivity.  This agrees with the common finding that 
uncertainty amplifies phenomena found under risk.  Several studies have observed a-
insensitivity in the gain domain (Abdellaoui, Vossmann, & Weber 2005; Fellner 1961 
p. 684; Gayer 2010; Kahn & Sarin 1988 p. 270; Kahneman & Tversky 1975 p. 15 2
nd
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para; Kahneman & Tversky 1979 p. 281 lines -6/-5 and p. 289 l. 5-6; Kilka & Weber 
2001; Viscusi 1989; Weber 1994 pp. 237-238).  For losses, we are aware of only one 
study examining a-insensitivity (Abdellaoui, Vossmann, & Weber 2005); they 
confirmed it.  It leads, for instance, to lower insurance premiums rather than the 
higher ones predicted by the universal ambiguity aversion often assumed in 
theoretical studies. 
 The findings for C-ambiguity regarding insensitivity do not agree with the 
common finding of a-insensitivity when analyzed in the usual way.  We find less, 
rather than more, insensitivity than under risk.  This finding is hard to reconcile with 
modern views on ambiguity, and suggests that background assumptions are violated.  
We will explore and discuss this suggestion in more detail in Experiment B. 
 Explanation for over-sensitivity and less ambiguity aversion in C-ambiguity.  In 
general, there must be a control for degrees of belief to measure ambiguity attitudes.  
For example, if we find a preference for gambling on an ambiguous rather than on an 
unambiguous event and want to explain this finding as ambiguity aversion, then the 
two events must have the same degree of belief/likelihood in some sense.  In 
situations of ambiguity as considered here, comparisons are usually made between 
events with the same midpoint probabilities, where the latter should provide the 
required control.  We have followed this averaging tradition in our analysis for both I- 
and C-ambiguity. 
 For extreme events in C-ambiguity, the above belief/likelihood control may be 
problematic though.  If the first agent assigns probability 1 to some event and the 
second agent assigns probability 0.8, then the first agent is apparently sure whereas 
the second is uncertain.  It then makes sense to assign more confidence weight (Nau 
2002) to the first, sure, agent’s judgment than to the second, insecure, judgment.  The 
perceived likelihood will then exceed the midpoint 0.9.  Such a processing of 
information is perfectly sensible, and leads to the high weight assigned to such events.  
It can be captured by rational Bayesian decision models, irrespective of any 
ambiguity.  Our finding then implies that agents who express certainty receive extra 
weight in conflicting- belief aggregation.  This is consistent with findings by Budescu 
& Yu (2006, 2007), Yates et al. (1996), and Keren and Teigen (2001).  It generates an 
effect counter to a-insensitivity, and, if it is not recognized, it may seem that neutrality 
or even oversensitivity was found, as happened in our experiment. 
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 One clear implication of our research is therefore to caution against the common 
practice in experiments on probability intervals to control for likelihood perceptions 
of such intervals through their midpoints.  Our findings indeed show that probability 
intervals and, more generally, sets of multiple priors cannot all be analyzed in the 
same way.  The source of uncertainty matters.  In particular, we cannot just equate 
{ℓ,h} with its convex hull [ℓ,h].  It matters whether agents have the same or different 
information (Crès, Gilboa, & Vieille 2011; Dietrich 2010).   
 Gajdos et al.’s (2008) contraction expected utility model, theoretically extended 
to belief aggregation by Gajdos & Vergnaud (2011), can be an alternative to our 
source method for analyzing the phenomena found here.  Their contractions of a 
priori given probability intervals can be used to differentiate between different 
sources of uncertainty.  To gain more insight into motivational versus cognitive 
factors underlying our explanation, we devised another experiment presented in the 
next section. 
3  Experiment B 
3.1  Introduction 
Because Experiment A raises questions about subjective probabilities and the 
(cognitive) likelihood perception of extreme events, Experiment B focuses on such 
events.  We now additionally ask for direct judgments of probability.  Although such 
data is not based on revealed preferences, it can shed further light on the cognitive 
conjectures resulting from Experiment A.  These conjectures entail that people do not 
have a different ambiguity attitude in the C-ambiguity of x{0.8,1}y than in the I-
ambiguity of x[0.8,1]y.  Instead, they simply have a higher degree of belief that x will 
happen.  It will enhance S-shaped judged probabilities (as functions of midpoint 
probabilities) for C-ambiguity.  If these conjectures are correct, then direct probability 
judgments can support them. 
 
3.2  Experimental method 
In most respects, this experiment is like Experiment A.  We focus on the differences 
in what follows. 
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 Protocol.  N = 63 bachelor and master students (36 male, median age = 20.5, 40 
Dutch) at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands participated, taken from an 
email list of students willing to participate in experiments on decision making.  They 
were guaranteed a €15 flat participation fee.  The experiment was conducted in six 
sessions of 10 or 11 subjects.
7
 
 We first asked the subjects to answer binary choice questions, as in Experiment 
A, using the same software.  We elicited CEs of the 18 prospects displayed in Table 4.  
The order of the prospects was randomized for each subject. 
 Unlike in Experiment A, we also asked the subjects to give their judged beliefs 
for the prospects B13-B18.  We randomly selected one prospect to check the stability 
of the answers.  Two subjects gave erratic judged beliefs, showing lack of 
understanding, and were removed from the sample. 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Stimuli.  To elicit judged beliefs, we presented the subjects with a figure 
displaying a prospect (I-ambiguity or C-ambiguity) on the left-hand side of the screen.  
On the right-hand side, there was an input box where subjects could type their best 
estimate (on a 0-1 scale) of the probability of losing €1000.  As soon as the best 
estimate was entered, a pie appeared to visually represent the probability.  Figure A.2 
in the appendix displays an example of a screenshot. 
 Checking consistency.  Unlike in Experiment A, in Experiment B we did not 
measure consistency by asking the subjects to repeat choices between some prospects 
and their expected value.  Instead, we randomly selected two prospects and asked the 
subjects to go through the whole CE elicitation process again.  As explained before, 
we also repeated the elicitation of one judged belief per subject. 
 
3.3  Results 
Consistency checks 
                                                
7
 In this second experiment, unlike Experiment A, subjects were not individually interviewed 
by the experimenter.  They could ask questions as often as needed.  Instructions were in 
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We find no difference between the two CEs elicited for consistency checks (p = 0.18, 
t121 = –1.36).  The repeated judged beliefs did not differ either (p = 0.49, t60 = 0.69). 
 
Risk attitudes from parametric fitting 
We estimated the parameters of the utility function and the probability weighting 
function (Table 5) using the twelve risky prospects B1-B12 in Table 4.  The estimate 
of β exceeds 1 (p < 0.01, t60 = 4.36), indicating concave utility.  This result is 
consistent with Experiment A. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
As in Experiment A, the mean value of δ is smaller than 1 (p = 0.02, t60 = −2.36), 
enhancing optimism.  Unlike in Experiment A, the mean value of γ is not different 
from 1 here (t-test: p = 0.24, t60 = 1.18).  Experiment B’s probability weighting 
function therefore is closer to linear, which is not uncommon for losses. 
 
Ambiguity attitudes from parametric fitting using matching probabilities 
We derived matching probabilities as in Experiment A. For I-ambiguity, the a-
insensitivity index is positive (mean = 0.12, p < 0.01, t60 = 3.64) and the ambiguity 
aversion index is positive but only marginally significant (mean = 0.03, p = 0.08, t60 = 
1.77).  I-ambiguity therefore exhibits the same pattern as in Experiment A (i.e., Figure 
4 is similar to Figs. 2a/2d).  For C-ambiguity, both indexes do not differ from 0 (i.e., 
Fig. 4 is similar to Fig 2e).  The I-index of a-insensitivity exceeds the C-index (p < 
0.01, t60 = 3.31), but the I-index of ambiguity aversion is not larger (p = 0.28, t60 = 
1.09). 
 For I-ambiguity, we find overestimation for midpoint probability 0.1 (mean = 
0.16, p < 0.01, t60 = 3.30), and we find underestimation for midpoint probability 0.9 
(mean = 0.86, p = 0.01, t60 = −2.57).  The matching probabilities for C-ambiguity do 
not deviate from the midpoint probabilities 0.1 and 0.9.  They are only somewhat 
higher for midpoint probability 0.5 (mean = 0.54, p < 0.01, t60 = 2.77).  As in 
Experiment A, C-matching probabilities do not exhibit an inverse-S shape. 
                                                                                                                                      
English, as is often done in the Netherlands where many students are non-Dutch. 
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INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 An ANOVA corrected for repeated measures and with two factors (the three 
probability levels and the two types of ambiguity) and their interaction reveals that, in 
addition to the probability level (p < 0.01, F1.89 = 757.32), the interaction term is 
significant (p < 0.01, F1.80 = 7.96).  Using paired t-tests adjusted with the Bonferroni 
correction, we find mi(0.1) > mc(0.1) (p < 0.01, t60 = –4.38) as in Experiment A. 
 
Judged beliefs 
Figure 5 displays the mean values of the I- and C-judged beliefs as a function of 
midpoint probabilities.  It shows that the judged beliefs never differ from the midpoint 
probabilities for I-ambiguity.  However, they exceed the midpoint probability at 
probability 0.9 for C-ambiguity (mean = 0.91, p < 0.01, t60 = 2.72).  By t-tests, only 
the a-insensitivity index for C-ambiguity is marginally significant, and it is negative 
(mean = –0.01, p = 0.09, t60 = 1.75), suggesting over-sensitivity.  Apart from this, 
perceived probabilities seem to agree well with midpoint probabilities. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 We next compare matching probabilities with judged beliefs.  Matching 
probabilities exhibit more insensitivity.  The difference is significant for I-ambiguity 
(mean difference = 0.11, p < 0.01, t60 = 3.44) but not for C-ambiguity (mean 
difference = 0.04, p = 0.12, t60 = 1.58).  An ANOVA with two factors (the elicitation 
technique—matching probabilities vs judged beliefs; and the types of ambiguity) and 
their interaction confirms the results of t-tests: the main effect of elicitation technique 
is significant (p < 0.01, F0.1 = 8.39), like the source (p < 0.01, F1 = 14.46) and the 
interactions term (p = 0.02, F1 = 5.90).  The same analysis on the ambiguity aversion 
indexes does not give significant results.   
3.4  Summary of the results of Experiment B 
The results of Experiment B are consistent with those of Experiment A for risk and 
ambiguity (matching probabilities) attitudes.  Again, we find significant violations of 
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expected utility for risk and we find the usual a-insensitivity for I-ambiguity but not 
for C-ambiguity.  For I-ambiguity, the judged beliefs agree with midpoint 
probabilities, supporting the use of midpoint probabilities as levels of belief.  This 
supports our claim in the discussion of Experiment A, under “evidence against the 
Bayesian model,” that the weights in Figures 3 and 4 do not reflect (just) subjective 
probabilities, but that something else is going on: nonneutral attitudes towards 
ambiguity, deviating from expected utility. 
 The judged beliefs for C-ambiguity deviate from the midpoint probabilities.  The 
judged belief at 0.9 exceeded 0.9, and the index of a-insensitivity was (marginally) 
below the neutral value 0.  This extra sensitivity went against the usual a-insensitivity, 
and these two effects together gave the end result of no a-insensitivity for C-
ambiguity.  The extra oversensitivity relative to I-ambiguity was not caused by a 
change in the non-Bayesian component of ambiguity attitude or perception.  Instead, 
it took place at the level of beliefs, i.e. of perceived likelihood.  It would have 
occurred similarly had the decision makers been Bayesian. 
4  Discussion 
Real incentives and hypothetical choice.  It is well known that performance-
contingent real incentives are desirable in experiments.  They enhance truthful 
answering and reduce noise (Camerer & Hogarth 1999; Hertwig & Ortmann 2001).  
Designing real decision situations with agent judgments available and disagreeing as 
required for our research, and doing so without deceiving these agents or the subjects, 
is very difficult to implement.  We preferred to keep this first empirical study on 
belief aggregations under ambiguity simple and clear, which is why we chose a flat 
payment and hypothetical choice.
8
  Given the ubiquity of belief aggregation in social 
behavior, and the necessity to consider ambiguity there, we felt that empirical studies 
are warranted even if no real incentives are possible. 
 There are extra reasons for using hypothetical choice when studying the, 
empirically important, losses.  First, implementing real losses by making the subjects 
                                                
8
 For this reason, we also assumed that the beliefs were reported simultaneously.  
Inconsistency of sequential beliefs due to updating or changes of mind is studied by Li 
(2007). 
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lose their own money is ethically questionable and hard to implement.  The common 
implementation of losses, with prior endowments from which subjects pay back, has 
another serious drawback.  Many subjects will integrate the payments and will not 
perceive any losses.  Even if, as some studies have found, this number of subjects is a 
minority, say it is one-third, then still this minority may generate large distortions in 
the experiment, large enough to be responsible for any significant effects found.  One-
third of the subjects misperceiving the stimuli entails too big a distortion, and is too 
high a price to pay for implementing real incentives.  Another drawback of prior 
endowments is that they may generate house money effects (Thaler and Johnson 
1990). 
 Directly measuring matched probabilities.  We measured matching probabilities 
m(E) indirectly from decision weights, through m(E) = w−
1
(W(E)).  Matching 
probabilities can be inferred directly from equivalences (xq0) ~ (xE0).  Substitution of 
Eqs. 1.1-1.3 then gives m(E) = q.  We tried such direct measurements in pilots.  
Unfortunately, many subjects would routinely take q equal to the midpoint 
probability, not as an expression of true preference but as an easy heuristic.  For this 
reason, and because the measurement of w and W is useful anyhow, we decided not to 
measure matching probabilities directly. 
 Alternative statistics for measuring ambiguity: avoiding commitment to 
parametric families. We could have chosen several equivalent ways to report the 
results from the three sources and the comparisons between them.  We first reported 
absolute results for risk.  For uncertainty, we reported differences with risk, i.e. how 
uncertainty deviates from risk.  Those differences are referred to as ambiguity, an 
important and popular topic in the literature today.  Absolute results about decisions 
under uncertainty can now be derived indirectly, as when taking compositions of the 
curves in Figures 1 and 2.  For example, we find some overweighting for risk, and 
some additional overweighting due to ambiguity for midpoint probability 0.1.  
Together this means that there is considerable overweighting under uncertainty.   
 To analyze ambiguity, we could also have investigated differences of certainty 
equivalents of the risky and the uncertain prospects.  This analysis is consistent with 
the one reported here and is in the appendix.  Thus, our conclusions do not depend on 
the particular parametric families that we chose to fit the risk attitudes. 
 Formal difference with the source method of Abdellaoui et al. (2011).  In 
Abdellaoui et al.’s (2011) source method, sources refer to different algebras, i.e. 
 25 
different collections of subsets (events) of the state space.  We, instead, compared the 
same (algebra of) events under different informational circumstances.  Although our 
sources are formally different, we can nevertheless readily use the same techniques of 
comparing ambiguity attitudes by comparing differences in subjective-probability 
weighting.  Abdellaoui et al.’s (2011) analysis of source functions rather than 
matching probabilities was discussed in §1. 
 Specifying outcomes when measuring beliefs.  We decided to specify outcomes in 
the elicitation of beliefs, to stay close to the other stimuli in the experiment.  It implies 
that some subjects may have taken these questions as preference questions, directly 
measuring the matching probabilities.  We obviously asked for judged likelihoods and 
not for preferences, hoping to trigger enough direct belief perceptions to obtain 
significant effects, which we did indeed obtain.  The distortion due to misperception 
as decision question goes opposite to our findings and, hence, our significance 
inferences are not invalidated but are conservative. 
 The two-stage model.  Several authors have studied a two-stage decomposition  
      W(E) =  w;~(J(E))  (4.1) 
where J denotes directly-judged belief, and w;~ is the function carrying those 
judgments to decision weights (de Lara Resende & Wu 2010; Fox & Tversky 1998; 
Kilka & Weber 2001; Tversky & Fox 1995; Viscusi & Evans 2006; Wu & Gonzalez 
1999).  Earlier allusions to the two-stage decompositions with directly-judged beliefs 
J are in Fellner (1961 p. 672) and Kahneman & Tversky (1975 pp. 14, 15).  The two-
stage decomposition differs from our decomposition W(E) = w(m(E)) where m 
denotes matched probability and w is the risky weighting function.  We can study the 
two-stage model in Experiment B, where we measured judged probabilities.  For C-
ambiguity, w;~ of Eq. 4.1 then exhibits the usual inverse-S shape.  This illustrates 
once more that our findings for C-ambiguity are due to beliefs deviating from 
midpoint probabilities rather than to unusual ambiguity attitudes. 
 
5  Conclusion 
This paper introduced modern ambiguity models into the empirical study of belief 
aggregation.  These ambiguity models are descriptively more accurate than the 
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common classical Bayesian models, and explain the violations of the latter that we 
found in belief aggregation.  They allow the distinction of cognitive factors (ability to 
discriminate different levels of likelihood) and motivational factors (aversion to 
ambiguity), and the analysis of their separate effects.  In between-agent uncertainty 
(conflict; C-ambiguity), extreme beliefs generate extra preference value (source 
preference) and, as regards cognitive effects, are overweighted in belief aggregation.  
These phenomena do not occur in within-agent uncertainty (imprecision; I-
ambiguity).  The latter is closer to traditional ambiguity.  For C-ambiguity, the 
cognitive effects entail an empirical violation of the commonly assumed averaging of 
beliefs.   
 An implication of our findings for belief aggregation is that agents may want to 
overpresent their certainty.  Hence, it is extra warranted for principals to implement 
incentive-compatible bonuses.  An implication for modern theories of ambiguity is 
that identical (convex hulls of) possible priors can be treated differently by the same 
individual depending on the source of uncertainty.  We conclude that modern 
ambiguity theory has allowed a more refined, and empirically more valid, analysis of 
belief aggregation in our paper than would have been possible using traditional 
theories. 
 
Appendix.  Experimental details and further results 
This appendix gives experimental details and further results.  We first describe details 
pertaining to both experiments. 
A1. Experimental details for both experiments 
Stimuli for eliciting certainty equivalents (CEs) 
 
Figure A.1 displays some stimuli. 
 
INSERT FIGURE A.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
To simplify the subjects’ task, the screenshots for risky, I and C sources of 
uncertainty had exactly the same structure.  Risky/I/C prospects (Option 1) were 
systematically displayed on the left-hand side and the sure loss (Option 2) was 
displayed on the right-hand side of the computer screen.  Whatever the source of 
uncertainty, x (high loss) was assigned to purple and y (small loss) to yellow.  There 
was no time pressure.  Subjects were given the time they needed and were encouraged 
to think carefully about the questions.  The software allowed the subjects to modify 
their answers if they wished, by going backward. 
Procedure for eliciting certainty equivalents 
We developed computerized bisection software to estimate the CEs.  Bisection does 
not require subjects to state precise indifference values.  It involves choices only, and 
generates more reliable data than direct matching (Bostic et al. 1990; Fischer et al. 
1999; Noussair, Robbin, & Ruffieux 2004).   
 Each CE measurement started with a choice between the prospect considered and 
a sure loss equal to the expected value under the (midpoint) probability.  A preference 
for the sure loss (the prospect) generated a higher (lower) sure loss in the next 
question.  The new sure loss was the midpoint of the highest sure loss accepted up to 
that point (or the worst outcome of the prospect if no sure loss had been accepted) and 
the lowest sure loss rejected up to that point (or the best outcome of the prospect if no 
sure loss had been rejected).   
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 Subjects were asked to make choices until a sure loss resulted with a precision of 
±1% of the difference between the two outcomes of the prospect, and this sure loss 
was taken as the CE.  Between three and seven choices were usually required to 
estimate CEs.  The precision was implemented as the stopping rule of the bisection 
process.  For instance, if Option 1 involved outcomes €0 and €1000, the program 
stopped when the subjects had rejected a sure loss, but had accepted another sure loss 
that was €20 lower.  Table A.1 gives an example. 
 
INSERT TABLE A.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
This elicitation process prevented subjects from evaluating prospects higher (lower) 
than their best (worst) outcomes.  It also ensured that a sure loss would not be rejected 
when a higher one had been already accepted (by not asking such a question).  It did 
not preclude all violations of stochastic dominance.  For example, subjects could 
assign a lower certainty equivalent to xpy than to xp'y despite p' > p.  
 
A2. Experimental details for Experiment B 
Stimuli for eliciting judged beliefs 
Figure A.2 displays the successive screenshots used to elicit judged belief under C, 
before (Screenshot A) and after (Screenshot B) entering a judged belief. 
 
INSERT FIGURE A.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
A3. Additional results for both experiments 
Consistency checks 
The main text reports consistency checks.  In the two experiments, neither the source 
of uncertainty nor the question characteristics influence the consistency.  In 
Experiment A, some choices are repeated as a consistency check.  A Friedman test 
reveals that the consistency rate does not significantly depend on the source of 
uncertainty (p = 0.34).  Similarly, a Cochran test for dichotomous data shows that it 
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does not significantly depend on the question (p = 0.08).  In Experiment B, several 
certainty equivalents (randomly selected) were elicited twice.  An ANOVA shows 
that neither the source of uncertainty (p = 0.15), nor the midpoint probability (p = 
0.23), nor the minimum loss (p = 0.85), nor the maximum loss (p = 0.68) of the 
prospects, significantly influences the measurement errors.  
Certainty equivalents 
In Tables A.2, A.3, and A.4, each line has 61 observations and the degree of freedom 
of each test is 60. EV means expected value and StD means standard deviation.  
 
INSERT TABLE A.2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity attitudes directly inferred from certainty 
equivalents 
The main text reported tests of risk and ambiguity attitudes using the parameters 
estimated through parametric fitting.  We can also analyze risk and ambiguity 
attitudes by directly comparing CEs with expected values and other CEs.  These tests 
are consistent with the results in the main text, and are reported next. 
 
Experiment A 
To test risk attitudes, we compare CEs with expected values for the risky prospects 
A1-A10 using t-tests.  We find that people are mainly risk averse for low probabilities 
(A1: p = 0.02) and risk seeking for moderate and high probabilities (A4-A10: p < 
0.01).  Risk neutrality cannot be rejected for the other two prospects.  These results 
are consistent with the common findings for prospect theory for risk (Wakker 2010 
§9.5).  For the other prospects, both risk and ambiguity attitudes play a role.  We use 
the term uncertainty attitude for the combination of the two.  We use midpoint 
probabilities for I and C to obtain (analogs of) expected values.   
 We find ambiguity aversion for I-ambiguity in the sense that CE < EV for low 
probabilities (A11-A12: p < 0.01) and ambiguity seeking for moderate and high 
probabilities (A14, A15: p < 0.01).  Neutrality cannot be rejected for A13.  These 
results confirm the prediction of prospect theory that phenomena for risk similarly 
occur for ambiguity, even in an amplified manner (referenced in the main text).  The 
latter prediction is less clearly confirmed for C-ambiguity.  We only find ambiguity 
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aversion for one low probability (A17: p = 0.04).  We do find ambiguity seeking for 
moderate and high probabilities (A19, A20: p < 0.01).  Ambiguity neutrality cannot 
be rejected for A16 and A18.  These results show again that other factors play a role 
for C-ambiguity. 
 We can directly infer ambiguity attitudes from CEs by comparing the CEs 
elicited for I- or C-ambiguity (A-11-A15 and A16-A20) with those elicited under risk 
(A1-A5).  Although this analysis will, obviously, not give exactly the same results 
and significance values as the analysis in the main text (which involves more data –
we ignore A6-A10 here– and nonlinear transformations), most results, and all main 
phenomena described in the main text remain the same.  First, an ANOVA corrected 
for repeated measures (with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction) with two factors (the 
five probability levels and the two types of ambiguity plus risk) confirms that CEs 
depend on the probability level (p < 0.01), which is obvious, but they also depend on 
the type of ambiguity or risk (p < 0.01).  The interaction term is also significant (p < 
0.01), confirming that the degree of ambiguity aversion depends on how likely the 
occurrence of the bad outcome is.  These results are the same as those obtained for 
matching probabilities in the main text. 
 Second, we can use CEs to analyze overall ambiguity aversion, similarly as we 
used the ambiguity aversion index in the main text as an overall index.  Thus we 
compare, for all probability levels together, the CEs under the two types of ambiguity 
with those under risk (i.e., the main effect of the second factor of the ANOVA), to 
assess ambiguity aversion.  The result can then be compared with the results derived 
from the ambiguity aversion index.  This analysis shows that, overall, CEs under I-
ambiguity are lower than those under risk (p < 0.01), which indicates ambiguity 
aversion under I-ambiguity.  There is no difference between the effect of risk and the 
effect of C-ambiguity (p = 1), indicating ambiguity neutrality in C-ambiguity. CEs 
under I-ambiguity are lower than under C-ambiguity (p < 0.01), indicating more 
ambiguity aversion under I-ambiguity than under C-ambiguity.  In other words, these 
results replicate the findings that the ambiguity aversion index is positive under I-
ambiguity and higher under I- than under C-ambiguity. 
 Third, pairwise comparisons of CEs at each probability level are also instructive 
to observe the effect of a-insensitivity.  Consistent with the a-insensitivity index being 
negative for C-ambiguity, CEs tend to be higher under C-ambiguity than under risk at 
r = 0.1 (p = 0.06) and lower at r = 0.9 (p < 0.01).  This indeed reveals that CEs vary 
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more under C-ambiguity than under risk when the midpoint probability varies, 
suggesting a-generated over-sensitivity for C-ambiguity.  However, CEs vary less 
under I-ambiguity than under risk when probabilities vary: they are significantly 
lower at 0.1 (p = 0.01) and not significantly different at 0.9 (p = 0.72).  Again, this is 
consistent with the positive a-insensitivity index that we obtain for I-ambiguity.   
 Finally, we report in the main text that mi(0.1) > mc(0.1) (p < 0.01) and mi(0.9) < 
mc(0.9) (p < 0.01).  We similarly find that the CEs are lower under I- than under C-
ambiguity at 0.1 (p < 0.01) and higher under I- than under C-ambiguity at 0.9 (p = 
0.04).  This inversion, which appears both for matching probabilities and CEs, can be 
explained by more a-insensitivity under I- than under C-ambiguity (as we found using 
indexes for matching probabilities). 
 
Experiment B 
As in Experiment A, we compare CEs with expected values to investigate risk and 
ambiguity attitudes.  For risk (B1-B10), we find risk aversion for small probabilities 
(B1: p = 0.03), but risk seeking for moderate and high probabilities (B5: p = 0.04; 
B10: p = 0.02; B6, B7, B9-B12: p < 0.01).  Risk neutrality cannot be rejected for the 
other four prospects.  These results are again consistent with what prospect theory 
predicts. 
 Similar to Experiment A, for I-ambiguity we find ambiguity aversion for small 
probabilities (B13: p < 0.01), but ambiguity seeking for intermediate and high 
probabilities (B15: p < 0.01).  Ambiguity neutrality cannot be rejected for B14.  
Again, these results are consistent with what prospect theory predicts. 
 As in Experiment A, we find a less clear pattern for C-ambiguity.  Ambiguity 
seeking for high probabilities (B18: p < 0.01) is still significant, but ambiguity 
neutrality cannot be rejected for B16 and B17. 
 Ambiguity attitudes can be analyzed by comparing the CEs under risk (B1, B4, 
B7) with the CEs obtained for I-ambiguity (B13, B14, B15), and then with the CEs 
obtained for C-ambiguity (B16, B17, B18).  As for matching probabilities, an 
ANOVA corrected for repeated measures (with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction) 
with two factors (the five probability levels and the two types of ambiguity plus risk) 
shows that the probability factor and the interaction term are significant (p < 0.01).   
 The effect of the type of ambiguity or risk (not distinguishing probability levels; 
i.e., studying the main effect of the first factor of the ANOVA) does not differ from 
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one type to the others (p > 0.4 for all pairwise comparisons).  This is consistent with 
the finding that the ambiguity aversion index is not significantly different from 0 for 
C-ambiguity and only marginally significant for I-ambiguity. 
 In the main text, we report a-insensitivity for I-ambiguity and more a-
insensitivity for I-ambiguity than in C-ambiguity.  This is consistent with CEs in I-
ambiguity being significantly lower than CEs under risk and C-ambiguity at midpoint 
0.1 (p = 0.04 and p < 0.01) and not significantly different at midpoint 0.9 (p = 1 and p 
= 0.4).  For low likelihoods, our subjects indeed disliked the I-ambiguity prospect 
more than the other prospects, but this difference disappeared for higher likelihoods 
(and was even reversed, though not significantly, in CEs).  Consequently, as for 
matching probabilities, the CEs at 0.1 and 0.9 tended to be closer to each other for I-
ambiguity than they were for C-ambiguity or risk.  This property for matching 
probability is what we defined as a-insensitivity. 
 As a conclusion, for both Experiments A and Experiment B, all phenomena 
observed for matching probabilities are consistent with those derived from the CEs.  
Therefore, the parametric family that we used to obtain matching probabilities does 
not influence the results.  However, the CE analysis is more complex, for instance 
involving multiple, simultaneous comparisons to observe a-insensitivity.  This is why 
we decided to report the analysis in terms of matching probability in the main text. 
Risk attitude 
In both Experiments A and B, the mean estimate of the parameter of the utility 
function significantly exceeds 1, indicating concavity of the utility function.  
Although in the loss domain, individuals are supposed to mostly have convex utility 
functions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), experimental studies in the loss domain 
have reported mixed attitudes.  Some studies have reported convex utility function at 
least at the individual level, while others have reported linear (Abdellaoui Bleichrodt 
and L’Haridon, 2008) and concave utility functions (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and 
Paraschiv, 2007; Fennema and Van Assen, 1998; Etchart-Vincent, 2004). 
In both experiments, the probability weighting function exhibits some 
optimism.  This result is consistent with other studies in the loss domain (Abdellaoui, 
2000; Etchart-Vincent 2004).  As regards sensitivity, the probability weighting 
function of Experiment A exhibits the usual inverse S-shape whereas the function is 
convex in Experiment B.   
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Screenshot A: A risky prospect vs. a sure amount 
Screenshot B: A C prospect vs. a sure amount 
FIGURE A.1. Screenshots of typical choice tasks (Experiments A and B) 
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Screenshot A: Initial screen 
Screenshot B: After a judged belief has been entered 
FIGURE A.2. Screenshots of typical judgment task: A C prospect (Experiment B) 
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# Rank Source  p x y # Rank Source p x y 
A1 13 Risk 0.1 −1000 0 A11 2 I 0.1 −1000 0 
A2 3 Risk 0.3 −1000 0 A12 17 I 0.3 −1000 0 
A3 8 Risk 0.5 −1000 0 A13 6 I 0.5 −1000 0 
A4 5 Risk 0.7 −1000 0 A14 10 I 0.7 −1000 0 
A5 9 Risk 0.9 −1000 0 A15 11 I 0.9 −1000 0 
A6 7 Risk 0.5 −500 0 A16 15 C 0.1 −1000 0 
A7 18 Risk 0.5 −500 −250 A17 16 C 0.3 −1000 0 
A8 20 Risk 0.5 −750 −500 A18 19 C 0.5 −1000 0 
A9 14 Risk 0.5 −1000 −500 A19 12 C 0.7 −1000 0 
A10 4 Risk 0.5 −1000 −750 A20 1 C 0.9 −1000 0 
TABLE 1. xpy (risk), or x[p−0.1,p+0.1]y (I), or x{p−0.1,p+0.1}y (C} 
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Source of uncertainty Risk I C 
Prospect # A1 A3 A11 A13 A16 A18 
Number of consistent subjects  42 54 51 47 45 44 
Consistency rate 69% 89% 84% 77% 74% 72% 
TABLE 2. Consistency check (Experiment A) 
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Function Parameter Mean (Median)  SD  
u(x) = −(−x/1000)
β
, x ≤ 
0 
β (concavity) 1.26 (1.13) 0.52 
w(p) = δp
γ
/(δp
γ
+(1−p)
γ
) δ (elevation) 0.75 (0.72) 0.33 
 γ (S-shape) 0.86 (0.73) 0.49 
TABLE 3. Parameters of the utility and weighting functions (Experiment A) 
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# Source p x y # Source  p−r p+r x y 
B1 Risk 0.1 −1000 0 B13 I 0 0.2 −1000 0 
B2 Risk 0.2 −1000 0 B14 I 0.4 0.6 −1000 0 
B3 Risk 0.4 −1000 0 B15 I 0.8 1 −1000 0 
B4 Risk 0.5 −1000 0 B16 C 0 0.2 −1000 0 
B5 Risk 0.6 −1000 0 B17 C 0.4 0.6 −1000 0 
B6 Risk 0.8 −1000 0 B18 C 0.8 1 −1000 0 
B7 Risk 0.9 −1000 0       
B8 Risk 0.5 −500 0       
B9 Risk 0.5 −500 −25
0 
      
B10 Risk 0.5 −750 −50
0 
      
B11 Risk 0.5 −1000 −50
0 
      
B12 Risk 0.5 −1000 −75
0 
      
TABLE 4. Eighteen prospects (Experiment B) 
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Function Parameter Mean (Median)  SD  
u(x) = −(−x/1000)
β
, x≤0. β 1.37 (1.26) 0.68 
w(p) = δp
γ
/(δp
γ
+(1−p)
γ
). δ (elevation) 0.81 (0.69)  0.61 
 γ (sensitivity) 1.17 (0.98)   1.09 
TABLE 5. Parameters of the utility and weighting functions (Experiment B) 
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Question Option 1 Option 2 Choice 
1 −1000{0.4,0.6}0 −500 Option 1 
2 −1000{0.4,0.6}0 −260 Option 2 
3 −1000{0.4,0.6}0 −380 Option 2 
4 −1000{0.4,0.6}0 −440 Option 1 
5 −1000{0.4,0.6}0 −420 Option 1 
6 −1000{0.4,0.6}0 −400 Option 2 
Estimated Certainty Equivalent: −410  
TABLE A.1. Actual choices of Subject 6 in Experiment B for a C prospect 
 
 
 
 t-test 
Mean 
vs.EV 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval #  
Mid- 
point 
X y EV Mean Median StD 
t p Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Experiment A 
A1 R 0.1 −1000 0 −100 −146 −90 148 −2.41 0.02 −184 −108 
A2 R 0.3 −1000 0 −300 −333 −290 134 −1.90 0.06 −367 −298 
A3 R 0.5 −1000 0 −500 −483 −490 138 0.98 0.33 −518 −448 
A4 R 0.7 −1000 0 −700 −633 −670 150 3.51 0.00 −671 −594 
A5 R 0.9 −1000 0 −900 −767 −770 130 7.99 0.00 −800 −733 
A6 R 0.5 −500 0 −250 −223 −215 65 3.23 0.00 −240 −207 
A7 R 0.5 −500 −250 −375 −358 −373 32 4.12 0.00 −366 −350 
A8 R 0.5 −750 −500 −625 −603 −608 35 5.06 0.00 −611 −594 
A9 R 0.5 −1000 −500 −750 −701 −715 65 5.90 0.00 −717 −684 
A10 R 0.5 −1000 −750 −875 −852 −863 36 4.99 0.00 −861 −843 
A11 I 0.1 −1000 0 −100 −221 −210 146 −6.49 0.00 −259 −184 
A12 I 0.3 −1000 0 −300 −346 −290 121 −2.96 0.00 −377 −315 
A13 I 0.5 −1000 0 −500 −488 −490 120 0.76 0.45 −519 −458 
A14 I 0.7 −1000 0 −700 −655 −650 105 3.34 0.00 −682 −628 
A15 I 0.9 −1000 0 −900 −788 −790 107 8.13 0.00 −816 −761 
A16 C 0.1 −1000 0 −100 −102 −90 76 −0.25 0.80 −122 −83 
A17 C 0.3 −1000 0 −300 −333 −290 123 −2.09 0.04 −364 −301 
A18 C 0.5 −1000 0 −500 −467 −450 156 1.63 0.11 −507 −427 
A19 C 0.7 −1000 0 −700 −649 −670 135 2.98 0.00 −683 −614 
A20 C 0.9 −1000 0 −900 −828 −850 102 5.53 0.00 −854 −802 
Experiment B 
B1 R 0.1 −1000 0 −100 −135 −90 122 −2.26 0.03 −166 −104 
B2 R 0.2 −1000 0 −200 −215 −190 131 −0.92 0.36 −249 −182 
B3 R 0.4 −1000 0 −400 −409 −390 134 −0.51 0.61 −443 −374 
B4 R 0.5 −1000 0 −500 −482 −490 168 0.85 0.40 −525 −439 
B5 R 0.6 −1000 0 −600 −558 −590 156 2.10 0.04 −598 −518 
B6 R 0.8 −1000 0 −800 −749 −790 128 3.10 0.00 −782 −716 
B7 R 0.9 −1000 0 −900 −841 −870 113 4.06 0.00 −870 −813 
B8 R 0.5 −500 0 −250 −244 −245 84 0.58 0.56 −265 −222 
B9 R 0.5 −500 −250 −375 −350 −358 52 3.86 0.00 −363 −336 
B10 R 0.5 −750 −500 −625 −611 −623 46 2.32 0.02 −623 −599 
B11 R 0.5 −1000 −500 −750 −701 −715 95 4.01 0.00 −726 −677 
B12 R 0.5 −1000 −750 −875 −841 −848 50 5.24 0.00 −854 −829 
B13 I 0.1 −1000 0 −100 −173 −130 130 −4.41 0.00 −207 −140 
B14 I 0.5 −1000 0 −500 −489 −490 141 0.58 0.56 −526 −453 
B15 I 0.9 −1000 0 −900 −833 −870 134 3.88 0.00 −868 −799 
B16 C 0.1 −1000 0 −100 −117 −90 100 −1.35 0.18 −143 −92 
B17 C 0.5 −1000 0 −500 −510 −490 146 −0.52 0.61 −547 −472 
B18 C 0.9 −1000 0 −900 −854 −890 128 2.82 0.01 −887 −821 
TABLE A.2. Certainty equivalent of each prospect 
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t-test 
Mean vs. 
Midpoint 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
 
Mid 
point 
Mean Median StD 
T p Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Experiment A – Matching probabilities 
I 0.1 0.19 0.13 0.16 4.43 0.00 0.15 0.23 
I 0.3 0.33 0.31 0.15 1.52 0.13 0.29 0.37 
I 0.5 0.53 0.54 0.14 1.71 0.09 0.49 0.56 
I 0.7 0.73 0.73 0.15 1.67 0.10 0.69 0.77 
I 0.9 0.86 0.88 0.11 −2.87 0.01 0.83 0.89 
C 0.1 0.06 0.04 0.07 −4.20 0.00 0.05 0.08 
C 0.3 0.31 0.30 0.15 0.46 0.65 0.27 0.35 
C 0.5 0.49 0.50 0.19 −0.30 0.76 0.44 0.54 
C 0.7 0.73 0.75 0.13 1.92 0.06 0.70 0.77 
C 0.9 0.90 0.92 0.08 0.37 0.71 0.88 0.92 
Experiment B – Matching probabilities 
I 0.1 0.16 0.12 0.13 3.30 0.00 0.12 0.19 
I 0.5 0.52 0.51 0.12 1.45 0.15 0.49 0.55 
I 0.9 0.86 0.89 0.11 −2.57 0.01 0.84 0.89 
C 0.1 0.10 0.07 0.10 −0.06 0.96 0.07 0.13 
C 0.5 0.54 0.53 0.11 2.77 0.01 0.51 0.56 
C 0.9 0.87 0.90 0.12 −1.72 0.09 0.84 0.90 
Experiment B −  Judged beliefs 
I 0.1 0.11 0.10 0.02 1.62 0.11 0.10 0.11 
I 0.5 0.50 0.50 0.02 1.55 0.13 0.50 0.51 
I 0.9 0.90 0.90 0.03 0.47 0.64 0.89 0.91 
C 0.1 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.37 0.71 0.09 0.11 
C 0.5 0.50 0.50 0.03 0.46 0.64 0.49 0.51 
C 0.9 0.91 0.90 0.03 2.72 0.01 0.90 0.92 
Table A.3: Matched probabilities and judged beliefs 
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t-test 95% Confidence 
Interval 
 Index  Mean Median StD 
t p Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Experiment A 
I 0.06 0.06 0.15 2.94 0.00 0.02 0.10 Ambiguity 
Aversion C 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.97 −0.03 0.03 
I 0.13 0.06 0.27 3.84 0.00 0.06 0.20 
Matching 
probabilities 
Insensitivity 
C −0.05 −0.04 0.20 −2.08 0.04 −0.10 0.00 
Experiment B 
I 0.03 0.00 0.13 1.77 0.08 0.00 0.06 Ambiguity 
Aversion C 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.46 0.64 −0.02 0.04 
I 0.12 0.03 0.25 3.64 0.00 0.05 0.18 
Matching 
probabilities 
Insensitivity 
C 0.03 0.00 0.21 1.16 0.25 −0.02 0.09 
I 0.01 0.00 0.04 1.49 0.14 0.00 0.02 Ambiguity 
Aversion C 0.01 0.00 0.05 1.62 0.11 0.00 0.02 
I 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.89 0.38 −0.01 0.01 
Judged 
beliefs 
Insensitivity 
C −0.01 0.00 0.06 −1.75 0.08 −0.03 0.00 
Table A.4: Indexes 
 
 
